

Tap On, Tap Off:

Onscreen Keyboards & Mobile Password Entry

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Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

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Outline

- ✦ Who we are
- ✦ Purpose
- ✦ Usability background
- ✦ Password security background
- ✦ Prior work
- ✦ Current methodology and results
- ✦ Conclusions

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Computational Cognitive Modeling
Voting Usability

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Voting Security

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Symmetric Cryptography
PRNGs
Voting Security

The Problem

6n04%Ei'Hm3V is 23 taps



EHVnim6043%' is 15 taps



Using Keyboard from Android Lollipop

Purpose

- ✦ Explore current state of usability and security metrics for passwords
- ✦ Assign strength metrics to passwords for which we already had usability metrics
 - ✦ How much entropy is lost as a result of permuting passwords to be easier to enter on mobile devices?

Usability Background

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Usability


- ✦ Context of use
- ✦ Effectiveness
- ✦ Efficiency
- ✦ Satisfaction

Usability: ISO 9241

- ✦ “The extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use.”


Usability: Context of Use

- “Users, tasks, equipment (hardware, software and materials), and the physical and social environments in which a product is used.” [ISO 9241]
 - Mobile vs. desktop context



Usability: Effectiveness

- “Accuracy and completeness with which users achieve specified goals.” [ISO 9241]
- Generally measured via error rates
 - Password entry errors



Usability: Efficiency

- ✦ “Resources expended in relation to the accuracy and completeness with which users achieve specified goals.” [ISO 9241]
- ✦ Generally measured via time on task
 - ✦ Password entry time
 - ✦ Number of keystrokes (taps)



Usability: Satisfaction

- ✦ “Freedom from discomfort, and positive attitudes towards the use of the product.” [ISO 9241]
- ✦ Generally measured via standardized or customized questionnaires



Usability & Security Parallels

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Satisfaction

Password Security Background

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Attacks on Passwords

- ✦ Password guessing
 - ✦ Brute force
 - ✦ Intelligent guessing
 - ✦ Eavesdropping
 - ✦ Social Engineering
 - ✦ Physical attacks
- We are only concerned with these classes of attacks*

Password Strength

- ✦ Password strength is often expressed in terms of entropy
 - ✦ *Note: Entropy is at most only loosely related to the use of the term in thermodynamics.*
- ✦ Entropy was originally defined by Claude Shannon in the 1950s

Password Metric Groups

- ✦ Two password metric groups
- ✦ Classified by how a password is created
 - ✦ user generated passwords
 - ✦ system generated passwords
(a.k.a. randomly generated)
- ✦ Password metrics measure only one of these groups

Randomly Generated Password Metrics

- ✧ Shannon entropy formula: $H = \log_2 (B^L)$
 - ✧ H = total entropy
 - ✧ B = number of characters to choose from
 - ✧ L = password length
- ✧ [Kuo, 2006] uses modified Shannon entropy

Shannon Entropy Examples

Password	Entropy Estimate
5c2'Qe	39.33
3.bH1o	39.33
a7t?C2#	45.88
m3)61fHw	52.44
p4d46*3TxY	65.55
q80<U/C2mv	65.55
d51)u4;X3wrf	78.66
6n04%Ei'Hm3V	78.66
m#o)fp^2aRf207	91.76
4i_55fQ\$2Mnh30	91.76

User Generated Password Metrics

- ✦ “Guessing entropy”
 - ✦ Estimate of the average amount of work required to guess the password of a selected user
 - ✦ Uses Shannon entropy as a foundation
 - ✦ “Measures” password strength based on a ruleset

User Generated Password Metrics

- ✦ “Min-entropy”
 - ✦ Difficulty of guessing the easiest single password to guess in the population
 - ✦ NIST specifies dictionary tests and password histories as heuristics to ensure at least 10 bits of entropy

800-63 Entropy Heuristic

- ✦ From NIST SP 800-63-2:
 - ✦ 1st character = 4 bits per character
 - ✦ 2nd thru 8th = 2 bits per character
 - ✦ 9th thru 20th = 1.5 bits per character
 - ✦ 21+ = 1 bit per character
 - ✦ Upper + lower + non-alphabetic = 6 bit bonus
 - ✦ Dictionary check = 6 bit bonus

800-63 Min-Entropy Ruleset

- ✦ Search a dictionary of at least 50,000 words for the password
 - ✦ If found, reject password
- ✦ Passwords that are detectable permutations of the username are not allowed

Our Research & Results

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Prior Work

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Prior Work

- ✦ Recent behavioral study on mobile password entry
- ✦ Participants had to learn, input, and recall 10 random passwords
- ✦ Onscreen keyboard switching significantly increased input time and introduced errors [Greene, Gallagher, Stanton, & Lee, 2014]








Measurement Granularity

- ✦ Password level
 - ✦ The entire password is either accepted or fails
- ✦ Character level
 - ✦ Multiple types of character errors
(e.g., transposition, deletion, substitution)
- ✦ Important to look at the nature and number of errors users make when inputting passwords


Tiny Keyboards = More Errors




Onscreen Keyboards



Screen Depth 1



Screen Depth 2



Screen Depth 3



Current Work

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Methodology


- Defined a password permutation
 - Divided characters in password into “classes”
 - Uppercase (U), lowercase (L), numbers (N), and symbols (S)
 - Group similar characters together
- Example:
 - 5c2'Qe is permuted to Qce52'

Permutation and Tap Counts

Original Password	Permuted Password	Length	Taps: Original, Permuted	Keyboard Changes: Original, Permuted	Taps Saved
5c2'Qe	Qce52'	6	11, 8	4, 1	3
m3)61fHw	Hmfw361)	8	11, 10	2, 1	1
q80<U/C2mv	UCqmv802</	10	19, 15	7, 3	4
6n04%Ei'Hm3V	EHVnim6043%'	12	24, 17	9, 2	7
m#o)fp^2aRf207	Rmofpaf2207#)^	14	24, 19	10, 4	6

Password Collisions

- Multiple unique passwords can permute to the same password:



Our Results

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Experiment 1: Fan-Out

How many passwords
collide with the same user-
friendly password?

How Many Collisions?

Length	10 th Percentile	90 th Percentile	Average
6	120	180	159
8	840	1680	1329
10	5040	25200	12659
12	27720	277200	132492
14	360360	3153150	1438513
16	2402400	40360320	17187712
18	24504480	514594080	208414540
20	221707200	6518191680	2327087101

Experiment 2: Entropy Loss

How much entropy is lost by
permuting passwords?

How Much Entropy Is Lost?

Length	10 th Percentile	90 th Percentile	Average	Additional Letters
6	6.9	7.5	7.3	2
8	9.7	10.7	10.4	3
10	12.3	14.6	13.6	3
12	14.8	18.1	17.0	4
14	18.0	21.6	20.4	5
16	21.5	25.0	24.0	6
18	24.5	28.9	27.6	6
20	27.9	32.6	31.2	7

Experiment 3: All-Lowercase

How much additional password length would we need to just change over to all lowercase letters?

What About All Lowercase?

Complex Password	All-Lowercase	Extra Letters
6	9	3
8	12	4
10	14	4
12	17	5
14	20	6
16	23	7
18	25	7
20	28	8

$q_{80} < U/C2mv$

VS

dmstpjnwwqiwqok

**Unholster your
phones and type this:**

m#o)fp^2aRf207

Now type this:
Rmofpaf2207#)^

Recap

- ✦ Entering complex passwords on mobile devices is difficult
- ✦ Our password permutation makes it easier
 - ✦ We precisely measure the security loss
 - ✦ Fixed by adding a couple extra characters

Conclusions

- ✦ **Device constraints matter**
- ✦ **Old password policies play badly with new devices**
- ✦ **Both usability and security must be considered**

Code

- ✦ <https://github.com/usnistgov/PasswordMetrics>
- ✦ <https://github.com/usnistgov/DataVis>

Questions?

- ✦ For additional research, visit NIST's Information Technology Laboratory:
 - ✦ Kristen Greene
Information Access Division
nist.gov/itl/iad
 - ✦ John Kelsey
Joshua Franklin
Computer Security Division
csrc.nist.gov

Acknowledgements

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- ✦ Jim Filliben

References

[Greene, Gallagher, Stanton, & Lee, 2014] I Can't Type That! P@\$\$w0rd Entry on Mobile Devices. In Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 8533, 2014, pp 160-171.

[Stanton & Greene, 2014] Character strings, memory, and passwords: What a recall study can tell us. In Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust, pp 195-206.

[ISO 9241] Ergonomic requirements for office work with visual display terminals (VDTs) -- Part 11: Guidance on usability.

[Kuo, 2006] Human Selection of Mnemonic Phrase-based Passwords, CUPS 2006.

[NIST SP 800-63-2] Burr et al, Electronic Authentication Guideline, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013.

[Shannon, 1948] C. E. Shannon, "A mathematical Theory of Communication, 1948.

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Extras


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Data Viz Tool

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Prior NIST Tool

- Cathryn Ploehn's SURF (Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship) project
- Shows usability and security metrics side-by-side for original and permuted passwords
- Multiple levels of granularity
- Filtering options
- <https://github.com/usnistgov/DataVis>



Display

Filter

Password length: 6 - 14


letters: 2 - 10


numerics: 1 - 8

special chars: 0 - 2

Rank by

Show/Hide Columns





VLv1!_
Jtr41!
VWq856
Xon5;*

Hmou3+

WQi22)

ARg86:

Ydn4:}

NGc8>|

QT18^-

Usp7\$]

Rpau7*

Qce52`

Do464&

Qqq3:-

Hbo31.

KI f121

JLv10]

Iqn1!+

Voc00|

Qc66=&

Wbu1<'

Auj4+^

Bt02/[

Of70)

CRi65%

Fgy3!\

JNr6]+

Oyxcg6{

Iy712;)


Tuc773J

LPD

per-rule and

total scores

keystrokes





Original Password

q856VW

Permuted Password

VWq856

Symbol start:	0	0	Symbol start
Number of Chunks:	0	0	Number of Chunks
Number of Characters:	2	2	Number of Characters
Unsentence-like capitalization:	1	1	Unsentence-like capitalization
Mixed Character String:	1	0	Mixed Character String
Pronounceable:	0	0	Pronounceable
Total LP Difficulty:	4	3	Total LP Difficulty
# of Desktop keystrokes:	11	10	# of Desktop keystrokes
# of Android Keystrokes:	11	10	# of Android Keystrokes
# of iPad Keystrokes:	11	10	# of iPad Keystrokes
entropy:	39	33	entropy

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